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Abstract A number of puzzles about propositional attitudes in semantics and phi-
losophy revolve around apparent referential dependencies between different attitudes
within a single agent’s mental state. In a series of papers, Hans Kamp (2003. . . 2015)
offers a general framework for describing such interconnected attitude complexes,
building on DRT and dynamic semantics. I demonstrate that Kamp’s proposal cannot
deal with referential dependencies between semantically conflicting attitudes, such
as those in Ninan’s (2008) puzzle about de re imagination. To solve the problem I
propose to replace Kamp’s treatment of attitudes as context change potentials with a
two-dimensional analysis.
Keywords Propositional attitudes · Hans Kamp · Ninan’s puzzle · DRT · Dynamic
semantics
1 Three puzzles about dependent attitudes
Detective Mary investigates a mysterious death. She thinks the deceased was mur-
dered and she hopes that the murderer is soon caught and arrested. A standard
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analysis of definite descriptions and of hope as a propositional attitude gives us two
different ways of characterizing Mary’s hope that the murderer is arrested (Quine
[24]):1
(1) a. de dicto : HOPEm∃x
[∀y [murderer(y) ↔ x = y] ∧ arrested(x)]
b. de re : ∃x [∀y [murderer(y) ↔ x = y] ∧ HOPEmarrested(x)
]
Neither of these logical forms captures what’s going on in the scenario. The de re
construal in (1b) is out since Mary’s hope is not directed towards a specific individ-
ual she is acquainted with, but rather towards whoever committed the murder. The de
dicto construal in (1a) is out because it entails that Mary hopes that there is a mur-
derer, while intuitively the scenario should be compatible with Mary desiring a world
without murder.2 What is going on, I submit, is that relative to her (de dicto) belief
that someone murdered the victim, Mary hopes that he or she is arrested. In other
words, Mary’s hope crucially depends on her beliefs.
Another illustration of the phenomenon of non-doxastic attitudes depending on
beliefs, comes from the interaction between attitude ascriptions and presuppositions
in discourse. Karttunen [17] observes that presuppositions triggered inside a hope
ascription can be satisfied by a preceding belief ascription.
(2) Bill believed that Fred had been beating his wife and hoped that Fred would
stop beating her.
This projection behavior is unexpected on the classical analysis of hopes and beliefs
as propositional attitudes. Linguistic analyses of Karttunen’s puzzle again appeal to
the idea of buletic attitudes being dependent on doxastic attitudes. Heim [10], for
instance, defines wanting in terms of a preference ranking on doxastic alternatives to
derive this peculiar projection behavior.3
A third puzzle concerns the standard analysis of de re attitudes in terms of
acquaintance Lewis [18]:
(3) a believes de re of b that he is P iff there is an acquaintance relation R with
R(a,b) and BELa∃x[∀y[R(i, y) ↔ y = x] ∧ P(x)].
In words, Mary believes de re of John that he’s an idiot iff Mary is in fact acquainted
with John, say, as a TV celebrity she saw on a talkshow once, and she believes (de
dicto) that the person she herself (the de se self-concept is represented as i in (3))4 is
acquainted with, i.e., the celebrity she saw on TV, is an idiot.
1I’m simply quantifying into the intensional environment here. See the discussion of Ninan’s puzzle below
for a more refined analysis of de re (and its problems).
2For some recent discussion of this puzzle see Elbourne [4], Schoubye [25].
3For some recent discussion of Karttunen’s puzzle and Heim’s semantics, see Villalta [27], Maier [20].
4I’ll be using the indexical i to represent the first-person or de se center of an attitude. Formally, that
means that the proposition it occurs in should be viewed as a “centered proposition”. In this case that
means that the attitude operator BEL quantifies over centered worlds. The formula in (3) means that all
centered belief alternatives 〈w, s〉 are such that the center s is uniquely R-acquainted with some x, and that
x has property P.
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Ninan [21] constructs a clear counterexample to a straightforward extension
of this analysis of de re belief to de re imagination. He sketches the following
scenario:
(4) Ralph sees Ortcutt sneaking around at the docks. Assume that this is the only
way in which he is acquainted with Ortcutt, i.e., he has never been in any
epistemic contact with this guy ever before. Based on his acquaintance with
Ortcutt he can start to imagine different things about him. For instance, he can
imagine what it would be like if he had never crossed paths with him.
According to the generalized Lewisian account we would capture this de re imagina-
tion as follows:
(5) ∃R[R(r, o) ∧ IMGr∃x[∀y[R(i, y) ↔ y = x] ∧ never.cross.paths(i,x)]]
But that means that, given the acquaintance relation R between Ralph and Ortcutt,
in all of Ralph’s imagination alternatives he himself (i.e., the de se center i) is R-
acquainted with someone with whom he has never crossed paths. But that amounts
to Ralph imagining a contradiction: being R-acquainted with someone while never
having crossed paths with them. We can construct similar examples with other coun-
terfactual attitudes – e.g., wishing or pretending that the thing you are looking at
never existed.5
As with the previous two puzzles, a parasitic analysis of imagination as dependent
on a doxastic background would solve the problem. Roughly, Ralph is then said to
believe that he is R-acquainted with someone and imagine, relative to that belief, that
he never met that person.
2 Aims and Scope
Hans Kamp ([12–16]) has been developing a framework for formally representing
mental states. Although not explicitly designed to solve these particular puzzles, it is
ideally suited for dealing with parasitic attitudes generally. By way of a preview of
the formal system that I will introduce, defend, and modify below, let me demonstrate
what the internal mental states of the protagonists of these puzzles would look like
in a (simplified fragment of) Kamp’s framework. In a nutshell, mental states are
sets of attitudes, which in turn consist of a mode indicator (BEL for belief, DES for
desire, etc.), and a Discourse Representation Structure (DRS) specifying the content
of the attitude in question. I’ll use the standard two-dimensional, box representation
of DRSs in which (i) an (optional) top compartment marks the introduction of some
discourse referents, think of this as existential quantification over variables, and the
bottom compartment contains descriptive conditions on these discourse referents.
5For some recent discussion of Ninan’s puzzle, see Yanovich [22], Ninan [28].
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Concretely, the mental states of detective Mary, Karttunen’s Fred, and Ninan’s Ralph
will be represented as follows:
(6)
Crucially, in all three mental states a non-doxastic attitude is dependent on a dox-
astic attitude in the sense that the non-doxastic attitude contains conditions with a
discourse referent that is introduced only in the doxastic attitude. This sharing of
discourse referents across attitudes allows us to capture the parasitic nature of the
puzzling attitudes, as diagnosed informally in Section 1. Thus the aim of this paper is
to provide a precise and general syntax and semantics for mental state representations
like the ones in (6).
2.1 Attitudes vs. Reports
It is important to note that the so-called Attitude Description Sets (ADS) in (6) are
not intended to directly represent the truth conditions of attitude reports, i.e., sen-
tences like Mary hopes that the murderer is arrested, but to represent the (relevant
parts of the) mental states of the protagonists of our puzzles. Formulating a linguis-
tic semantics of reports and a theory of mental states are distinct endeavors, but they
are not independent. On the basis of the theory of mental representation developed
in this paper we could eventually develop a semantics of attitude reports, in DRT or
some other framework. The first step in this extension from attitudes to reports would
be a rule that says that a statement of the form ‘α believes/hopes/imagines that φ’ is
true iff α has a mental state that is captured by an ADS in which the believe, hope, or
imagination component, respectively, contains the information contributed by φ.
Of course, this is just a rough first step towards a natural language report seman-
tics. An empirically adequate, compositional implementation faces many challenges
that I will not go into here.6 What does concern us here is what kind of structure
to put in our mental state representations (i.e., the syntax of our ADSs), and what it
means for an ADS to “capture” a mental state (i.e., the semantics).
6The construction of a (not quite compositional) semantics of attitude reports, along the lines suggested
here, is the subject of another paper [20]. In that paper I do the opposite, viz. focus on the linguistics and
simplify the underlying theory of mental states.
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2.2 Referential Dependence vs. Intentional Identity
Distinguishing attitudes from reports also brings out an important difference between
the parasitic attitudes under discussion and the seemingly related phenomenon of
intentional identity, as exemplified, first and foremost, by Geach’s [7] Hob–Nob
sentence.
(7) Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bobs mare and Nob wonders whether she killed
Cob’s sow.
In (7), the pronoun she in the complement of the attitude verb wonders appears to
be bound by a witch introduced in the complement of thinks, just like in (2) the
presupposition triggered in the complement of hoped is apparently bound by the
information contributed under the earlier believed. However, a closer look at the
attitudes ascribed to the protagonists in (7) and (2) reveals that Nob’s wondering is
not parasitic or referentially dependent on Hob’s beliefs in the way that Bill’s hope is
parasitic on his belief. Despite the anaphoric dependency in the Hob–Nob report, the
underlying attitudes of Hob and Nob are actually independent in the sense that (7)
can be true even if Nob knows nothing about Hob and his thoughts, or about Bob and
his mare. In the Karttunen puzzle, by contrast, the hope is dependent on the belief
in the strong sense that Bill’s hope cannot stand on its own or even be formulated
properly without recourse to the belief.
Non-reportative examples of intentional identity, as discussed in particular by
Dekker [1, 2], exhibit a similar independence as the Hob–Nob reports.
(8) A: A man is sleeping over there on a park bench.
B: It is not a man, it is a woman and she is not asleep, she is just sunbathing.
Besides, it is not a park bench. [Dekker & van Rooy 1997:4]
Superficially, it seems as if the belief expressed by B is referentially dependent
on that expressed by A, because the pronouns it and she in her response are
bound by discourse referents introduced by indefinites in A’s utterance. Moreover,
just as in Ninan’s puzzle, (4), these anaphorically linked attitudes are semanti-
cally incompatible. However, although the particular form in which B chose to
express his attitude only works in the context of A’s utterance, the de re atti-
tude itself is not strictly speaking dependent on anything in A’s mental state and
could equally well be expressed independently of it, with demonstratives or other
directly referential expressions instead of anaphoric pronouns. I conclude that inten-
tional identity is a distinct phenomenon from the parasitic attitudes in the puzzles
above.
In sum, this article is about how to model referential dependencies between dif-
ferent attitudes within a single agent’s complex mental state. I leave the semantics of
attitude reports and intentional identity for another occasion.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 3 I first guide
the reader through a basic fragment of Kamp’s theory of mental representation. In
Section 4 I argue that Kamp’s semantics fails to account for referential dependencies
between conflicting attitudes, like in Ninan’s puzzle and non-de re variations thereof.
In Section 5 I propose a modification of Kamp’s mental state semantics that addresses
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the generalized Ninan puzzle with a two-dimensional semantics for non-doxastic
attitudes.
3 Representing Mental States
As illustrated in (6), the basic idea is to represent mental states as Attitude Descrip-
tion Sets (ADS), sets of formulas in the DRS language paired with mode indicators
like BEL, DES, or IMG, specifying what the agent believes, desires and imagines,
respectively.
In this section I reconstruct the ADT framework presented most comprehensively
in Section 5 of the (book-length) DRT survey in the Handbook of Philosophical
Logic (Kamp et al. [16]). To focus the discussion I introduce some minor simplifica-
tions. In particular, I restrict attention to the three modes already encountered above.
Thus, I ignore the special mode indicator ANCH, that Kamp uses in his articles to
mark internal anchors. For Kamp, internal anchors are descriptive representations of
external res that the agent is acquainted with. In particular, Kamp’s representation
of the de re imagination in Ninan’s puzzle would involve an ANCH[x]-label rather
than a BEL-label on the box with the acquaintance information. Internal anchors,
and the corresponding external anchors that they presuppose, are indispensable in
Kamp’s semantic analysis of indefinites [15], proper names [14], and de re attitudes
and ascriptions [13]. However, as far as capturing the ‘narrow’ psychological inter-
pretation of ADSs is concerned, anchors in Kamp’s semantics really just amount to
beliefs. Since the puzzles above are about properly describing the internal mental
states of the protagonists involved, I will simply replace anchors with beliefs in my
ADSs, as already illustrated in the final ADS in (6).
Below I will first introduce some basic DRT notions, including its dynamic seman-
tics in terms of information states and context change potentials. With these notions
in place I then reconstruct Kamp’s ADS semantics. For readability, formal details are
moved to an Appendix. Readers familiar with DRT and dynamic semantics may want
to skip Subsection 3.1.
3.1 Discourse Representation Theory (DRT)
3.1.1 Introducing DRT
Kamp [11] introduced Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) as a semantic the-
ory of anaphora resolution in discourse. Its main selling points at the time were its
solution to two problems that plagued Montague Grammar, the dominant semantic
framework at the time, viz. cross-sentential anaphora (9a) and donkey sentences (9b).
(9) a. A friend of mine owns a donkey. He beats it.
b. If a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it.
The problem with both of these is that intuitively he and it are variables bound by
the existential quantifiers in a farmer/a friend of mine and a donkey, respectively, but
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a static, compositional semantics like Montague’s cannot derive plausible readings
where this is so.7 For (9a), binding is out because to interpret the discourse we must
start with the first sentence, and when that’s done we have a closed formula:
(10) ∃x∃y[friend(x) ∧ donkey(y) ∧ own(x, y)]
Note that the scope of the quantifiers in (10) is delimited by a closing bracket on the
right, so subsequent occurrences of x and y would be free.
For (9b) the problem is that indefinite noun phrases like a farmer always introduce
existential quantifiers into the compositional derivation, and even if we allow those
to take wide scope over the conditional (which Montague would in fact allow), this
never gives the right truth conditions.
Kamp’s solution involves a radical move, from a compositional, truth-conditional
sentence semantics to a dynamic discourse interpretation algorithm. The sentences in
a discourse are interpreted as successive updates on a context, represented as a DRS.
In other words, a sentence is analyzed as providing instructions on how to turn an
input DRS into an updated, more informative output DRS, capturing the Stalnake-
rian [26] idea that interpreting a sentence induces a contextual information growth.
In the update process, there is a fundamental split between indefinites, which intro-
duce new discourse referents into the context, and definites, including pronouns,
which pick up previously established, old discourse referents. Note finally that it is
the input and output DRSs, not the sentences, that are semantically interpreted in a
traditional model and that express the truth conditions of the discourse up to a certain
point.
Let me illustrate the above with the discourse in (9a). We start with an empty
DRS when the first sentence comes in. The two indefinites introduce fresh discourse
referents x and y into the DRS, resulting in the following output:
(11)
This output DRS represents the information that there is farmer and a donkey and
the former owns the latter, i.e., (11) is equivalent to (10) (as we can verify on the
basis of the precise syntax and semantics defined below). The crucial difference with
the static system comes out with the second sentence. The pronouns are interpreted
as instructions to retrieve appropriate antecedents from the input context. Since he
7Of course we can make ad hoc stipulations to deal with these specific cases. For instance, we could treat
(9a) as just a conjunction. This is ad hoc because surely we wouldn’t want to say that any discourse, say
a novel, or a long conversation between multiple people, consists of just one sentence, which cannot be
interpreted until it’s completed. Similarly, for (9b) we could say that a farmer is ambiguous between an
existential and a universal reading. Perhaps the least ad hoc way of dealing with the examples in (9) in
a traditional, static framework is the E-type approach, where pronouns are not variables but abbreviated
definite descriptions (cf. Heim [9]).
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requires a human antecedent, and it a non-human, the only option is to bind the first
to x and the second to y:
(12)
This final output DRS says that there is a friend of mine and a donkey and that friend
owns and beats that donkey, which corresponds to the intuitive truth conditions of the
discourse in (9a).
Kamp’s solution to the donkey anaphora puzzle in (9b) relies on a dynamic
interpretation of conditionals. Crucially, the indefinites and pronouns are treated
exactly as in the previous example: a farmer and a donkey introduce new
discourse referents, while the pronouns are looking for previously established
antecedents. Given the DRT syntax and semantics of conditionals, formally defined
in Sections 3.1.2–3.1.3 below, discourse referents introduced in the conditional
antecedens can bind variables in the consequens, so (13) is a well-formed, inter-
pretable output:
(13)
With the semantics for ⇒ (defined in (15c) below), this output DRS expresses the
right truth conditions, viz. that for every farmer f and donkey d, if f owns d, f also
beats d.
3.1.2 The Syntax of DRT
A DRS K is a pair, 〈U(K),Con(K)〉, consisting of a “universe” of discourse ref-
erents (x,y,. . .), and a set of conditions. Conditions can be atomic (e.g. walk(x)) or
complex (e.g. ¬K ′, with K ′ a DRS). Graphically, I’ll continue to represent a DRS
as a box with two compartments; the top compartment represents the universe, the
bottom the conditions (but I suppress the top compartment if it’s empty).
We (recursively) define FV (K), the free variables (or free discourse referents)
of K , as the set of discourse referents that occur free in the conditions but not in
the universe of K . DRSs without free variables we call proper. For details, see the
Appendix.
3.1.3 A Static Semantics for DRT
DRT provides a dynamic theory of interpretation, i.e., utterances are analyzed as
inducing information growth, modeled by means of DRS updates. Nonetheless,
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DRSs are typically given a static semantics in the form of a truth definition. Here
is an intensional version. Intensional models have the form 〈D,W, I〉, where D is a
domain of individuals, W a set of possible worlds, and I an interpretation function
that assigns sets of n-tuples of individuals to n-ary predicates, relative to a possible
world parameter.
The central notion of DRT semantics is that of a verifying embedding. A verifying
embedding of a proper DRS is an assignment function that maps all the discourse
referents in the universe of the DRS to entities in the model’s domain in such a way
that all conditions in that DRS come out true:
(14) f |=w K iff for all ψ ∈ Con(K) : f |=w ψ.
Condition verification is defined by cases. For example:
(15) a. f |=w P (x1, . . . xn) iff 〈f (x1), . . . , f (xn)〉 ∈ Iw(P )
b. f |=w ¬K ′ iff there is no g ⊇ f withDom(g) = Dom(f ) ∪ U(K ′) and
g |=w K ′.
c. f |=w K ′ ⇒ K ′′ iff for all g ⊇ f withDom(g) = Dom(f ) ∪ U(K ′) and
g |=w K ′, there is anh ⊇ gwithDom(h) = Dom(g)∪U(K ′′) andh |=w
K ′′.
A proper DRS, i.e., a DRS without free variables, is true in w if there exists a veri-
fying embedding of its universe into D. This leads to the following definition of the
proposition expressed by a proper DRS K .
(16) K = {w ∈ W there is an f withDom(f ) = U(K) and f |=w K}
This gives us a static interpretation of proper DRSs with which I will emulate a
classical Hintikka/Kripke analysis of propositional attitudes as intensional operators
in Section 3.2.2. As I will show there, such a classical semantics can’t account for
the referential dependencies in the ADSs exemplified in (6) above. To solve this
Kamp switches to a dynamic DRS semantics, mapping DRSs to information states
and context change potentials. Before turning to attitudes I introduce here already the
required notions from dynamic semantics.
3.1.4 A Dynamic Semantics for DRT
The starting point of dynamic semantics is that the context is modeled as an
information state and a sentence’s meaning is a function that transforms such a
context into a new, more informative one. Formally, information states are just
sets of possibilities, i.e. world–assignment pairs. Proper DRSs express information
states.
(17) Kis = {〈w, f 〉 Dom(f ) = U(K) and f |=w K}
Kis captures the informational content of a proper DRS in a strictly more fine-
grained way than K does, in the sense that from an information state we can
reconstruct the proposition (by deleting all the assignment functions) but not the
other way around. In other words, the information state expressed by K gives you
for every world in which K holds the embeddings that verify it, while a classical
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proposition expressed by K only tells you for each world whether there exists at least
one verifying embedding.
To illustrate the key notion of an information state, consider the first example DRS
from Subsection 3.1.1, repeated below:
(18)
The proposition expressed by (18), (18), is the set of worlds in which there exists
an embedding verifying the three conditions in w, i.e. an embedding f with f (x) is
a friend of mine in w, f (y) is a donkey in w, and f (x) owns f (x) in w. In other
words, the set of worlds in which there exist at least one friend who owns at least one
donkey. The information state expressed by (18), (18)is, is the set of all possibilities
〈w, f 〉 for which Dom(f ) = {x, y}, and f verifies the three conditions in w.
The truly dynamic content of a DRS should model the way it affects its context,
modeled as an information state, i.e., its context change potential. Below I’ll formal-
ize context change potentials as partial functions from input to output information
states. However, before going into the technical details, I should point out that my
eventual proposal does not depend on the notion of a context change potential. The
only reason I discuss it here is in order to be able to reconstruct Kamp et al.’s [16]
proposal, which, I will argue, is ultimately unsatisfactory. The reader who is not inter-
ested in my reconstruction of Kamp’s proposal (Subsection 3.2.3) and why it fails
(Section 4) could safely skip the remainder of this section as well. For a proper DRS
K the idea is that Kccp extends its input information state with information from
K , by extending the verifying embeddings to cover U(K) and throwing out possi-
bilities not compatible with Con(K). More precisely, for a proper DRS K and an
information state s:
(19) Kccp(s) = {〈w, f 〉 ∃g [〈w, g〉 ∈ s ∧ f ⊇ g ∧ Dom(f ) = Dom(g) ∪ U(K)
∧f |=w K]}
An improper DRS K updates a context in the same way, but only if that context
introduces the discourse referents that are free in K . To make this precise note first
that in an information state expressed by a proper DRS all embeddings have the same
domain. We call this domain the base of the information state. In fact, throughout the
paper we’ll only consider information states s that have a well-defined base Base(s).
We can now say that Kccp is only defined for an information state s if FV (K) ⊆
Base(s); if defined, its value is given by (19).
3.2 Attitude Description Theory (ADT)
3.2.1 The Syntax of ADT
An Attitude Description Set (ADS) is a set of pairs of the form 〈M,K〉, where M is a
mode label (e.g., BEL, DES, IMG) andK a DRS.We’ve already seen that some of the
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attitude DRSs contain free variables. In a proper ADS all free variables in these open
DRSs are introduced in some other DRS. If a free variable in K1 is introduced in the
universe of K2 we say that K1 is referentially dependent on K2, notation: K2 ≺ K1.
For instance, in the simple examples of ADSs considered in (6) above we’ve seen
desire DRSs and an imagination DRS referentially dependent on belief DRSs.
An ADS K is well-founded if all chains of such referential dependence are non-
circular, i.e. if the transitive closure of ≺ on K is well-founded. In the following we
exclude ADSs as in (20) which are either improper (20a), or not well-founded (20b).
(20)
A distinctive feature of Kamp’s analysis is that mental state descriptions may contain
multiple distinct attitudes even of the same mode, as illustrated in (21):
(21) {〈BEL,K1〉 , 〈BEL,K2〉 , 〈DES,K3〉} , withKi DRSs.
Kamp’s primary motivation for representing beliefs as discrete entities rather than
specifying just a single belief state seems to be to avoid some instances of the
problem of logical omniscience. Specifically, the type exemplified by Lewis’s [19]
inconsistent beliefs that Nassau Street runs roughly east–west, that the railroad runs
north–south, and that the two are roughly parallel. To avoid ascribing to himself
a single inconsistent belief state, Lewis proposes that a belief state may be “frag-
mented”, containing various distinct but overlapping belief fragments. We can think
of the distinct BEL -labeled DRS in an ADS as representing such belief fragments.
Apart from combating logical omniscience, the expressive power afforded by the
fragmented attitudes model may be particularly valuable when developing potential
refinements where we, for instance, assign different weights/probabilities to different
beliefs and/or model fine-grained belief revision mechanisms.
Below I sketch Kamp’s semantics for the ADS language, and show what’s wrong
with it, but to motivate the substantial machinery involved I’ll start with developing
a classical propositional approach and see why that doesn’t work in the first place.8
3.2.2 A Static Semantics for ADT
Giving a semantics for ADT means defining when a given ADS accurately represents
an agent’s mental state as given by the model. The first question is therefore, what
kind of mental state entities do we add to our intensional models? And the second,
how do we ‘match’ those with an ADS?
8My presentation of ADT deviates from Kamp’s. In particular, I added the static PBAS system below in
order to motivate the dynamic approach.
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If we just focus on belief first, the classical (Kripke/Hintikka-style) answer to the
first question would be to specify for each agent (at a time and world) a set of doxastic
alternatives. The intuitive motivation is that a world w is a doxastic alternative for an
agent if, were we to place that agent in w and allow her to investigate indefinitely,
she would find no evidence that w was not her home world (Haas-Spohn [8]). The
answer to the second question, i.e., the matching condition, is the requirement that
x’s belief state is compatible with a sentence φ iff the proposition expressed by φ is
true in all doxastic alternatives.
To extend this familiar picture to mental states consisting of multiple, distinct atti-
tudes, we first add a set of a buletic alternatives, and a set of imagination alternatives.
A mental state is now modeled as a triple of propositions.9 But in our fragmented
model we have not one set of doxastic alternatives, but multiple potentially overlap-
ping ones – and similarly for the other modes of attitude. Matching the syntax of
ADSs we thus end up modelling an agent’s mental state as what I will call, mim-
icking the terminology of Kamp et al. [16], a Proposition-Based Attitudinal State
description (PBAS), a set of propositions paired with mode indicators.
(22) {〈BEL, p1〉 , 〈BEL, p2〉 , 〈DES, p3〉} , withpi ⊆ W.
Then the question of matching: When does a syntactic description in the form of an
ADS like (21) count as an accurate representation of a semantic PBAS like (22)?
The first observation is that if John’s mental state includes, say, a desire to buy a
red Mercedes we want to say that an ADS representation of John with a desire to
buy a car is correct. To capture this type of partial matching we say, following the
Hintikka/Kripke analysis, that a syntactic ADS matches a semantic PBAS if the atti-
tudes in the PBAS entail the contents of the corresponding attitudes represented in
the ADS. The relevant notion of entailment here is the standard entailment between
propositions: p entails q iff p ⊆ q. In sum, we model the interpretation of an ADS
relative to a PBAS with the following matching condition:
(23) An ADSK captures the PBASA iff for every 〈M,K〉 ∈ K there is a
〈M,p〉 ∈ A such thatp ⊆ K.
For some very simple examples where all attitude DRSs in an ADS are proper this
will give adequate results. However, the whole point of the ADS structure is to allow
referential dependencies between attitudes, which involves improper attitude DRSs
(inside an overall proper ADS). Consider detective Mary’s mental state: she believes
there is a murderer x, and desires that x get caught.
(24)
9Or rather, to take de se attitudes into account, centered propositions, but I try to abstract away from that
issue here.
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In other words, Mary’s desire DRS has a free variable x and hence does not express
a classical proposition on its own.
Conclusion: the classical proposition-based approach fails because attitudes that
are referentially dependent on other attitudes do not express propositions. Kamp’s
actual proposal relies on a dynamic rather than static semantics, precisely because
we can then assign appropriate semantic values to improper DRSs.
3.2.3 A Dynamic Semantics for ADT
Kamp’s alternative answer to the first question is that the model should associate with
each agent an Information State Based Attitudinal State description (ISBAS), a set-
theoretic construct in which an agent’s attitudes are represented as dynamic semantic
values, i.e. context change potentials.
The move from propositions to context change potentials can be broken down into
two steps. First, we move from propositions (sets of possible worlds) to information
states (sets of world–assignment pairs). Both are ways of formalizing information,
but, as noted above, the latter is strictly more finegrained. The extra structure in infor-
mation states is used in dynamic semantics to account for anaphoric dependencies in
discourse. Here, we exploit it to account for referential dependencies between atti-
tudes. In a PBAS the set of worlds w in which there exist at least one farmer and
one donkey such that the former beats the latter constitute the propositional belief
that there is a farmer who beats a donkey. Here, by contrast, the set of possibilities
of the form 〈w, f 〉 with f (x) is a farmer in w, f (y) a donkey, and f (x) beats f (y)
in w models the more finely individuated belief that a farmer mentally represented
by the discourse referent x beats a donkey, represented as y. In other words, modeled
as information states, beliefs and other attitudes carry information organized around
specific (mental) discourse referents.10
Switching from propositions to information states however does not solve the
problem identified above: a referentially dependent attitude DRS expresses neither
a proposition nor an information state, so we still can’t directly match the DRSs in
an ADS with corresponding information states in an ISBAS. To fix this, the sec-
ond step is to switch from information states to context change potentials (CCP),
which is a semantic notion designed to capture the dynamic content of any DRS,
with or without free variables. This solves the matching problem for referentially
dependent attitudes. Concretely, the agent’s complete mental state is now repre-
sented as a set of labeled CCPs, and an ADS captures an ISBAS if the labeled
CCPs in the ISBAS entail the CCPs expressed by the corresponding attitude DRSs in
the ADS.
A complication is that the relevant notion of entailment in dynamic semantics is
defined at the level of information states, not context change potentials, viz. through
the relation :
10For more on the philosophical motivations and linguistic applications of information states and dynamic
semantics, cf. Dekker [2].
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(25) s  s′ iff s contains at least as much information as s′ (where ‘more infor-
mation’ would mean a larger base and/or fewer possibilities, cf. Appendix for
definition)
Somehow we need to extract information states from the CCPs in the ISBAS, and
from the (proper and improper) attitude DRSs in an ADS. The idea is the same in
both cases, but let’s start with the ADS.
A proper attitude DRS already expresses an information state but an improper one
does not. It expresses merely a partial context change potential, which needs a suit-
able input information state to provide a information state that captures its content.
In well-founded and proper ADSs any improper attitude DRS referentially depends
on other attitude DRSs, and these may again depend on others, but eventually all
free variables will be grounded in proper DRSs. To illustrate the general framework
consider an abstract example ADS with an imagination depending on a belief and a
desire, which depends on another belief:
(26) Example ADS: {〈BEL,K1〉 , 〈BEL,K2〉 , 〈DES,K3〉 , 〈 IMG,K4〉} , withK1 ≺
K4 andK2 ≺ K3 ≺ K4.
The DRSs at the bottom of the ≺-chains, K1 and K2, are independent and hence
proper DRSs, which directly express information states. K3 is not independent and
hence expresses only a CCP. We turn that CCP into a suitable information state by
applying it to the information state expressed by the DRS it depends on within K ,




Note that the partial context change potential expressed by K3 is indeed defined
for this input argument because, by the assumed ≺-structure (and properness/well-
foundedness), all free variables in K3 are introduced in U(K2).
Attitude DRSs may also depend on multiple other attitude DRSs. K4 depends on
both K1 and K3 so its context change potential will not be defined on the information
states expressed by either alone. Kamp proposes to first merge the information states
of the underlying DRSs (cf. Appendix):
(28) K4
is
K = K4ccp(K1isK unionmulti K3isK )
In this way, Kamp manages to associate information states even with improper
attitude DRSs parasitic on one or more other attitude DRS within the same ADS.
We apply the same tricks to associate information states with the CCPs that make
up our ISBAS. This requires first of all a semantic analogue of referential depen-
dence, ≺∗, as a relation between context change potentials (cf. Appendix). With the
help of ≺∗ we recursively associate information states with the CCPs in an ISBAS.
A total CCP j determines a corresponding information state by applying it to the
empty information stateΛ: IS(j,A ) = j (Λ). A non-total CCP referentially depends
on other information states lower in the ≺∗-chain. Assuming that these are already
associated with information states, we define IS(j,A ) as the application of j to
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the merge of these underlying information states. We require of an ISBAS that this
recursive procedure for assigning information states is well-defined.
Now that we can associate information states with the attitude DRSs in a given
ADS and with the CCPs in a given ISBAS, we are almost ready to state the matching
condition. One last complication in moving from proposition matching to infor-
mation state matching comes from the introduction of discourse referents on the
model-theoretic side. The problem is that the discourse referents in an ADS are cho-
sen completely independently from the discourse referents in the agent’s head, as
modeled by the ISBAS. We solve this by introducing a variable renaming function
(and demanding that ADSs employ discourse referents from a set that is entirely
disjoint from those that occur in ISBAS).
Finally then, we can state Kamp’s matching condition:
(29) An ADS K captures an ISBAS A iff there is a variable renaming function
r on K such that for every 〈M,K〉 ∈ K there is a 〈M, j〉 ∈ A such that
IS(j,A )  r(K)isr(K )
In concrete applications below I’ll abstract away from the variable renaming issue.
4 A Problem: Conflicts with Dependencies
Kamp’s attitude semantics allows us to model referential dependencies between dif-
ferent attitudes in an agent’s mental state. Kamp is surely not the first to recognize
that attitudes may be dependent on other attitudes within a single mental state, but
he seems to have been the first to implement this in a completely general way.
To see the benefits of this generality, compare it to, say, Heim’s [10] semantics of
belief-dependent wanting. The crucial ingredient is the idea that desire can be ana-
lyzed in terms of a preference ranking of doxastic alternatives, which indeed allows
Heim to capture the dependence of desire on belief. But this solution doesn’t extend
to, say, Ninan’s case of belief-dependent imagination, since imagination cannot be
explicated in terms of a preference ranking. Kamp’s system, by contrast, allows us
to describe arbitrarily complex chains of dependencies between attitudes, including
attitudes depending on multiple other attitudes simultaneously.
Kamp’s analysis builds on insights from dynamic semantics, in particular it uses
context change potentials and information states rather than propositions to model
the basic semantic content of the different attitudes. The trickiest part was assigning
information states to these context change potentials, viz., by recursively applying the
dependent context change potentials to the information states on which they depend.
As I argue below, it is this updating that causes trouble, which we can best bring
out by analyzing cases where the content of a dependent attitude conflicts with the
content of an attitude it depends on.
Consider a counterfactual attitude, more specifically one whose content contra-
dicts the content of an attitude it depends on. Ninan’s puzzle provides an example, but
in order not to get stuck on orthogonal issues involving de re and de se attitudes, let’s
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modify the detective example. Say Mary imagines what it would be like if whoever
murdered the victim had chosen a different lifestyle and never murdered anyone.
(30)
According to the Kampian semantics, this syntactic object K is a correct description
of someone’s mental state at a certain time and world in an intensional model if the
model’s ISBAS A at that time and world contains appropriately labeled CCPs that
entail the corresponding dynamic semantic contents of the two DRSs in (30), which
we will call K1 and K2. That is, if we can find in A a BEL-labeled CCP, j1, and a
IMG-labeled CCP, j2, such that:
(31) a. IS(j1,A )  K1isK
b. IS(j2,A )  K2isK .
To unpack (31a) (i.e., the matching condition for the belief component in (31)), we
must determine the information states associated with K1 (in K ) and j1 (in A ):
(32) a. K1
is
K = {〈w, f 〉 Dom(f ) = {x} and f (x) is a murderer inw}
b. IS(j1,A ) = j1(Λ)
Thematching requirement for the belief says that the ADS in (30) captures the agent’s
beliefs iff the state in (32b) contains at least as much information as that in (32a). In
words, this means that the doxastic CCP j1 in A must introduce (possibly among
other things) a discourse referent x representing a murderer.
Now we similarly unpack (31b). The CCP expressed by K2 is a partial function
on information states, which models the addition of the information in K2 to an input
state that already provides the discourse referent x:
(33) For all s with x ∈ Base(s) : K2ccp(s) = {〈w, f 〉 ∈ s f |=w K2}
= {〈w, f 〉 ∈ s f (x) is not a murderer inw}
We compute the information state associated with K2 by applying this CCP to the
belief state expressed by K1. The result is an inconsistent information state:
(34) K2
is
K = K2ccp(K1isK ) = { 〈w, f 〉 Dom(f ) = {x} and f (x) is amurderer
in w and f (x) is not a murderer in w } = ∅
This seems like an undesirable result. The informational content of the imagination in
the context of the belief it depends on should not be a trivial, contradictory informa-
tion state. What we have derived here is that the ADS in (30), apparently describing
a perfectly reasonable imagination, is semantically equivalent to one that describes
an internally inconsistent imagination, e.g. that x is not a murderer but murdered
someone, or simply that 0=1.
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Just to be sure, let’s finish spelling out the matching condition for imagination to
convince ourselves that this will not do. First, we get the information state associated
with j2 by applying it to the belief state associated with j1.
(35) IS(j2,A ) = j2(IS(j1,A ),A )
The matching condition for imagination says that K2 captures the agent’s imagina-
tion if (35) entails (34), i.e., if the imagination CCP j2 is such that applying it will
transform the belief state given by the ISBAS (that there is, possibly among other
things, some x who is a murderer) into the inconsistent information state in (34) (that
there is an x who is a murderer and not a murderer). That is, j2 matches K2 if it
explodes the previously computed doxastic information state.
Now note that it is not unexpected as such that updating the belief in the ADS
above with the imagination leads to inconsistency. The problem is rather that this
inconsistency doesn’t tell us much about what the agent’s imagination, j2, is like. An
internally inconsistent j that has nothing to do with K2 (e.g., the CCP that updates an
input state s with the information that x =x) would also satisfy the matching condi-
tion for K2. To put it differently, the current system fails to distinguish the perfectly
rational mental state of imagining something counter to what you believe, from a
mental state with a truly incoherent imagination, such as that x =x.
5 A Solution: Two-Dimensional Attitudes
5.1 Ninan on de re imagination
Ninan [21] offers two distinct solutions to his puzzle. The first involves relativizing
an agent’s imagination alternatives to a doxastic alternative, i.e., the model provides
us with belief-relative-imagination as a new primitive. The second involves multi-
centered worlds (further developed in Ninan [22]). In this Section I will show how we
can generalize Ninan’s first proposal and adapt it to our dynamic setting to overcome
the problem of conflicting attitudes in ADT.
Ninan’s idea is to add a second dimension to the notion of imagination. The
model has to provide imagination alternatives relative to beliefs. One way to define
the new belief-relative notion of imagination is as a function Img from possi-
ble worlds to sets of possible worlds, i.e., what Ninan calls a “two-dimensional
intension”.11
(36) w′ ∈ Img(w) iff if the agent’s doxastic state were {w} (i.e. the agent believes
she inhabitsw and is maximally opinionated on the matter), thenw′ would
be compatible with what the agent imagines.
To solve the de re imagination puzzle, Ninan then defines:
11I’m still abstracting away from orthogonal issues surrounding de se attitudes. Ninan’s implementation
uses centered worlds/propositions.
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(37) a imagines de re of b that he is P iff there is an acquaintance relation Rwith:
(i) R(a,b) and (ii) for all doxastic alternatives w there is a unique b′ that a
is R-acquainted with in w, and (iii) in all w′ ∈ Img(w), b′ is P.
In the scenario sketched in Section 1, R must be something like the relation x sees y
at the docks, so what (37) says is that for each doxastic alternative w there is a unique
man b′ that a sees at the docks, and all (w-relative) imagination alternatives w′ are
such that a never met b′. In sum, if we accept the new primitive belief-relative notion
of imagination, we can straightforwardly solve Ninan’s puzzle.
Below I will incorporate a generalization of Ninan’s proposal for arbitrary atti-
tudes into the dynamic ADT framework in order to solve the problem of conflicting
dependent attitudes, as brought out for Kamp’s original ADT in Section 4 above.
5.2 Two-Dimensional Attitudes in ADT
In my definitive proposal we model mental states model-theoretically as Ninan-
Based Attitudinal State descriptions (NBAS). An NBAS contains two-dimensional
attitude representations modeled after Img from (36). More specifically, a two-
dimensional attitude Q is a function mapping possibilities to information states
such that Q(〈w, f 〉) is the informational content of the attitude that the agent
would have were her background beliefs captured by the singleton information state
{〈w, f 〉}. Note that, in dynamic semantics, a singleton information state is simply
a maximally specific body of information about the relevant discourse referents. In
other words, being in a singleton belief state means you are maximally opinion-
ated about the world you inhabit and about the discourse referents the belief state
is about.
We’ll assume that for any two-dimensional attitude Q all possibilities in





〉 ∈ Q(〈w, f 〉) then f ′ ⊇ f.
An NBAS, then, is a set of pairs of the form 〈M,Q〉 with M a mode indicator and Q
such a two-dimensional attitude function from possibilities to information states.
As in the systems discussed in Subsection 3.2 above, the semantic matching con-
dition says that an ADS captures an NBAS iff every ADS compartment 〈M,K〉 is
entailed by a corresponding NBAS compartment 〈M,Q〉. This time, entailment is
relativized to a relevant background state, determined by the given dependency struc-
ture. Following Ninan’s static implementation, entailment relative to a background
state is computed by looking at each possibility in that background individually, and
checking entailment relative to the singleton state {〈w, f 〉}, i.e., checking for each
possibility 〈w, f 〉 in the relevant background state whether the agent’s attitudinal
state relative to 〈w, f 〉 contains all the information in K interpreted relative to the
accepted background anchor f . Using the notation BG(Q,A ) to denote the rel-
evant background state for interpreting the two-dimensional attitude Q as situated
within NBAS A (cf. Subsection 5.4 below for definition); and Kis,f to denote
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an anchored information state (cf. Appendix for definition), gives the following
matching condition.
(39) An ADSK captures an NBASA iff there is a variable renaming function
r onK such that for every 〈M,K〉 ∈ K there is a 〈M,Q〉 ∈ A such that for
all 〈w, f 〉 ∈ BG(Q,A ) : Q(〈w, f 〉)  r(K)is,f .
Essentially, (39) combines the Kampian semantic matching condition for ADT, as
reconstructed in Section 3.2.3, and (a suitably generalized and dynamified version
of) Ninan’s two-dimensional semantics, as reconstructed in Section 5.1.
5.3 Example 1: Ninan’s Puzzle
Before we delve into the general definition of attitudinal backgrounds, let me illus-
trate the system so far by applying it to the de dicto version of Ninan’s puzzle that
we used as a counterexample to Kamp’s system above.
(40)
As before, we’ll call the belief DRS K1 and the imagination K2. According to (39),
this ADS captures someone’s mental state given as an NBASA if the NBAS contains
a belief 〈BEL,Q1〉 and an imagination 〈IMG,Q2〉 such that (i) relative to any possi-
bility in the belief’s background, Q1 entails K1 and (ii) relative to any possibility in
the imagination’s background, Q2 entails K2. Formally:
(41) The ADSK in (40) captures NBASA iff
a. for all 〈w, f 〉 ∈ BG(Q1,A ) : Q1(〈w, f 〉)  K1is,f
b. for all 〈w, f 〉 ∈ BG(Q2,A ) : Q2(〈w, f 〉)  K2is,f
Intuitively, in this particular example it’s clear what the relevant background states
are. The belief DRS is referentially independent in the ADS, so let’s assume its
semantic counterpart Q1 in the NBAS is independent as well. This means that
BG(Q1,A ) is empty, i.e., the empty information state, Λ(= {〈w, ∅〉 w ∈ W }), not
the empty set. Filling that in in (41a) gives:
(42) for allw ∈ W : Q1(〈w, ∅〉)  K1is [⇔ (41a)]
In words: Q1, relative to any possible world, must contain at least all the infor-
mation in the belief DRS K1, i.e., that there is a murderer x. Now recall that
we assumed that Q1 was independent. If it is really independent, then, intuitively,
it should determine the same state relative to any background possibility, i.e.,
the Ninan-style two-dimensional background-relativity should be vacuous. We’ll
make this more precise below, but for now we’ll assume that Q1(〈w, ∅〉) =
Q1(
〈
w′, ∅〉) for any w,w′ ∈ W . We’ll use the notation Q1 to denote the belief
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state determined by Q1 relative to an arbitrary 〈w, ∅〉. Thus, the matching require-
ment for the belief is that Q1 should contain the information that there is a
murderer x.
The imagination DRS K2 is referentially dependent on the belief DRS, so its
semantic counterpart Q2 should be dependent on the belief’s counterpart Q1. Given
Q1’s independence, this means that BG(Q2,A ) = Q1. Filling this in in (41b):
(43) for all 〈w, f 〉 ∈ Q1 : Q2(〈w, f 〉)K2is,f [⇔(41b)]
Matching the imagination thus requires that Q2, relative to any belief-possibility
〈w, f 〉, entails the informational content of K2 relative to f . Now, any 〈w, f 〉 ∈ Q1
is such that x ∈ Dom(f ) (and, moreover, f (x) is a murderer in w), so using
such an f as anchor fixes the reference of the free variable x in K2: K2
is,f =
{〈w′, f 〉 f (x) ∈ Iw′(murderer)}. Relative to any belief-possibility 〈w, f 〉, wherein
f (x) is a murderer, the content of the imagination is that f (x) is not a murderer. This
captures precisely the nature of Ninan’s counterfactual imagination.
I conclude that Ninan’s two-dimensional solution to his problem of counterfactual
de re attitudes carries over to the more powerful dynamic ADT framework. Incorpo-
rating Ninan’s insight into ADT crucially involves moving from ISBAS, representing
attitudes as context change potentials, to NBAS, representing attitudes as information
states relative to a background possibility.
In the remainder of the paper I make the determination of the relevant backgrounds
for components of an NBASmore precise. I’ll thereby present an ADS semantics that
is as general as Kamp’s with respect to modeling parasitic attitudes (e.g., allowing
multiple simultaneous and recursive dependencies), but that avoids the problems of
counterfactual attitudes that I brought out in Section 4.
5.4 Determining Background States
The question that is not yet answered in sufficient detail and generality above is: How
do we determine the relevant background state, BG(Q,A ), for an arbitrary attitude
Q in an arbitrary NBAS A ? The idea is that the relevant attitudinal background
for interpreting a given dependent attitude should be determined on the basis of the
dependency structure in the NBAS.
The first hurdle is that, unlike with Kamp’s CCPs, in the current setup we can’t
compute a semantic dependency relation purely from the attitudes in the NBAS,
because every attitude is simply a function from possibilities to information states.
We’ll add a primitive semantic dependency relation ≺∗ to the NBAS and demand,
in the matching condition, that it mirrors the syntactic dependency ≺. Formally, this
requires adding some bookkeeping to the matching condition:12
(44) An ADSK captures an NBAS 〈A ,≺∗〉 iff there is a variable renaming function
r onK and a one-to-one function c fromK toA such that for every 〈M,K〉 ∈ K :
a. c(〈M,K〉) = 〈M, c2〈M,K〉〉 ∈ A
12c2 is the projection of the output of c on the second coordinate.









c. for every 〈w, f 〉 ∈ BG(c2(〈M,K〉),A ) : (c2(〈M,K〉))(〈w, f 〉)  r(K)is,f .
With ≺∗ we can determine for each attitude Q in A the set of attitudes it depends on:
(45) Deps(Q, 〈A ,≺∗〉) = {Q′ there is anM ′ such that 〈M ′,Q′〉 ∈ A andQ′ ≺∗ Q}
We call an attitude ≺∗-independent if its set of dependencies, as defined in (45), is
empty. If Q is independent, the Ninan-style background-relativity built into Q by
the general definition of attitudes as two-dimensional functions, should be vacuous.
We enforce this connection between (Kamp-style) ≺∗-dependence and (Ninan-style)
two-dimensional dependence as follows:
(46) If Q is ≺∗-independent in 〈A ,≺∗〉 , then: Q(〈w, f 〉) = Q(〈w′, f ′〉), for all
possibilities 〈w, f 〉 , 〈w′, f ′〉 with Dom(f ) = Dom(f ′).
Now, finally we can state the general definition of BG. The idea is that the
background of an independent attitude is the empty information state, while the back-
ground of a dependent attitude is the sum of the attitudinal states it depends on.
However, these attitudinal states may in turn depend on yet other backgrounds, which
introduces recursion into the definition. The full definition is in (47), an example
illustrating how it works follows in Section 5.5 below.
(47) BG(Q, 〈A ,≺∗〉) =⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
= Λ, ifQ is independent;
= ⋃ {Q1(i1) unionmulti . . . unionmulti Qn(in) i1 ∈ BG(Q1, 〈A ,≺∗〉) . . . in ∈ BG(Qn, 〈A ,≺∗〉)}
, ifDeps(Q, 〈A ,≺∗〉) = {Q1 . . .Qn}
5.5 Example 2: Multiple and Recursive Dependencies
Let me illustrate my proposal with the abstract example from (26), repeated below:
(48) Example ADS: {〈BEL,K1〉 , 〈BEL,K2〉 , 〈DES,K3〉 , 〈 IMG,K4〉} , withK1 ≺
K4 andK2 ≺ K3 ≺ K4. [= (26)]
To satisfy the matching condition in (44) we need an NBAS 〈A ,≺∗〉 with matching
intensional attitude components and a parallel dependency structure. As in the pre-
vious systems, a matching NBAS for this ADS could in principle have many more
components, but for simplicity let’s consider an NBAS with the same cardinality and
dependency structure as the ADS:
(49) Example NBAS: {〈BEL,Q1〉 , 〈BEL,Q2〉 , 〈DES,Q3〉 , 〈 IMG,Q4〉} , withQ1 ≺∗
Q4 andQ2 ≺∗ Q3 ≺∗ Q4.
The first part of the matching condition, i.e. (44a) and (44b), is now trivially satisfied
by choosing a one-to-one function c with c(〈M,Ki〉) = 〈M,Qi〉. We won’t worry
about renaming variables and assume that the discourse referents in the ADS and the
NBAS already match. The remaining, crucial requirement of the matching condition
is this:
(50) For every 〈w, f 〉 ∈ BG(Qi, 〈A ,≺∗〉) : Qi(〈w, f 〉)  Kiis,f (i = 1 . . . 4).
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Roughly, each attitude Qi in A , relative to any relevant background possibility, must
entail the information state expressed by the corresponding, anchored attitude DRS.
To figure out what that means we need to compute the relevant backgrounds for
each attitude. For the independent attitudes, the two beliefs, the background is the
empty information state. For readability I suppress the constant 〈A ,≺〉 arguments
from here on.
(51) BG(Q1) = BG(Q2) = Λ
The desire Q3 depends on the second belief Q2, so its background is the informa-
tion state given by Q2. Formally, however, Q2 is a function that needs a possibility
argument to yield an information state. Since Q2 is independent, its two-dimensional
background-relativity is vacuous (by (46)). Using the notational shorthand intro-
duced in Subsection 5.2: Q (= Q(〈w, ∅〉) for arbitrary w) represents the agent’s
independent belief state. Filling in the definition of backgrounds in (47) gives:
(52) BG(Q3) = ⋃ {Q2(i) i ∈ Λ} = Q2
In words, the background state for Q3 is the information state determined by the
independent belief Q2.
The imagination Q4 depends on two attitudes, hence its background requires
merging the information states of those attitudes, relative to their backgrounds:
(53) BG(Q4) = ⋃ {Q3(i1) unionmulti Q1(i2) i1 ∈ BG(Q3), i2 ∈ Λ}
= ⋃{Q3(i1) unionmulti Q1 i1 ∈ Q2
}
In words, BG(Q4) is the set of possibilities i in the merge of the independent belief
Q1 and the desire Q3 relative to i′, for some i′ in the independent belief state Q2.
Note the use of information state merging, unionmulti, in (53), which I borrow straight from
Kamp’s semantics: in case of multiple simultaneous dependencies, the background
attitudes are merged together into a single, blended background information state.
As a result, in our example we only get a meaningful imagination background if
the belief state Q1 is consistent with (some of) the relative desire states Q3(i′).13
Recall that, in fact, Kamp’s system further required consistency between dependent
attitudes and their backgrounds. It is this requirement that I showed to be problematic
in Section 4, and which we set out to solve here.
Having now computed the four background states we can return to the matching
condition, (50) for our example. Filling in the blanks gives:
(54) The ADS in (48) captures the NBAS in (49) iff
a. For every 〈w, f 〉 ∈ Λ : Q1(〈w, f 〉)  K1is,f
b. For every 〈w, f 〉 ∈ Λ : Q2(〈w, f 〉)  K2is,f
13As far as I can tell this prediction/constraint, which I share with Kamp’s original proposal, is unproblem-
atic. If counterexamples should arise, a possible solution to explore in future work could involve a more
sophisticated merge operation using ideas from belief revision to deal with inconsistencies (Ga¨rdenfors
[6]).
Referential Dependencies Between Conflicting Attitudes
c. For every 〈w, f 〉 ∈ Q2 : Q3(〈w, f 〉)  K3is,f
d. For every 〈w, f 〉 ∈ ⋃{Q3(i) unionmulti Q1 i ∈ Q2} : Q4(〈w, f 〉)  K4is,f
In words, (54a) and (54b) simply say that the two independent belief states in the
NBAS entail the corresponding belief DRSs. We can bring this out by rewriting
(54a,b) using our overline notation:
(55) a. Q1K1is [⇔ (54a)]
b. Q2K2is [⇔ (54b)]
As for the desire, (55c) says that the two-dimensional desire Q3 entails the desire
DRS K3 relative to every possibility in the belief Q2. This makes sense given that in
K the desire K3 referentially depends on the belief K2.
Finally, because of the recursive, multiple dependence, (55d) is not as easy to
read. It’s contribution may be brought out more clearly by rewriting it equivalently
as follows:
(56) For every 〈w, f 〉 ∈ Q1 and
〈
w′, f ′









The first, negative contribution of this paper consists in demonstrating that Kamp’s
semantic analysis of mental states falls prey to Ninan’s puzzle and variations thereof.
After carefully reconstructing Kamp’s Attitude Description Theory (ADT), I show
that the system fails to account for referential dependencies between inconsistent
attitudes. This is a serious limitation, because so-called counterfactual attitudes, like
imagining, pretending and wishing, are typically inconsistent with the beliefs on
which they depend.
In my reconstruction of Kamp’s system we see that the problem results from
the use of context change potentials as the primitive model-theoretic representations
of individual attitude contents. Based on this diagnosis I propose a solution where,
following an idea from Ninan, attitudes are given relative to an assumed background.
The current paper contributes to our understanding of human cognition in gen-
eral by developing a model of mental states as complex networks of interconnected
attitudes in a precise logical framework. Moreover, this ADT model has important
applications in linguistics. In [20], for instance, I use Kampian mental state repre-
sentations to analyze Karttunen’s [17] puzzle about presupposition resolution across
attitude ascription complements, and Pross [23] uses them to analyze Fodor’s [5]
‘third readings’ of attitude reports. But the impact of ADT extends beyond the seman-
tics of attitudes and reports. The ADT framework is a foundational component of
Kamp’s program of developing a communication-theoretic analysis of natural lan-
guage meaning in general. In his recent work Kamp has been arguing for a revival
of the classic sender–receiver model of communication in formal semantics. On
this view, semantics is not, or not only, about deriving participant-neutral meanings,
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such as objective truth conditions or potentials to update the common ground, but
rather involves formulating algorithms capturing the production and comprehension
of discourse by cognitive agents. Concretely, the speaker has a certain mental state,
modeled as an ADS, and wants to map that to an utterance. The hearer, by contrast,
takes an utterance as input and uses that to update her mental state, again modeled as
an ADS. A representational semantic analysis of mental states, with a precise model-
theoretic interpretation, such as that provided by the current modification of Kamp’s
ADT, is thus a first step in this new direction of natural language semantics in general.
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Appendix
Discourse Representation Theory (DRT)
(57) primitive symbols of DRS language
a. a set of predicatesPred = {P,Q,walk, john, beat,=, . . .}
b. a set of discourse referentsDRef = {x, y, x1, . . .}
(58) syntax of DRS language
a. if x1 . . . xn are discourse referents andP an n -place predicate, thenP(x1 . . . xn)
is a DRS condition
b. if x1 . . . xn are discourse referents andψ1 . . . ψm are DRS conditions,
then 〈{x1 . . . xn} , {ψ1 . . . ψm}〉 is a DRS (notation:U(K) − {x1 . . . xn}
andCon(K) = {ψ1 . . . ψm})
c. ifK,K ′ are DRSs, then¬K andK ⇒ K ′ are DRS conditions
(59) free variables of a DRS/condition:
a. FV (K) = ⋃ {FV (ψ) ψ ∈ Con(K)} \U(K)
b. FV (P (x1 . . . xn)) = {x1 . . . xn}
c. FV (¬K) = FV (K)
d. FV (K ⇒ K ′) = FV (K) ∪ (FV (K ′)\U(K))
e. K is proper ifFV (K) = ∅, improper otherwise.
(60) notation: f ⊆X g := f ⊆ g ∧ Dom(g) = Dom(f ) ∪ X
(61) intensional model: M = 〈D,W, I〉 , where I : W × Pred → ⋃n∈N Dn
(62) set of embeddings F:
f ∈ F iff f is a partial function fromDRef toD
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(63) embeddings verifying a DRS/condition, relative to a model M
(note: I suppress theM in notation throughout):
a. g |=w K if for allψ ∈ Con(K) : g |=w ψ
b. g |=w P (x1, . . . xn) if 〈g(x1) . . . g(xn)〉 ∈ Iw(P )
c. g |=w ¬K if there is noh ⊇U(K) gwithh |=w K.
(64) static interpretation of proper DRS K:
a. Kf = {w ∈ W ∃g ⊇U(K) f [f |=w K]
}
b. K = K∅
(65) set of information statesI :
s ∈ I iff
a. s ⊂ W × F
b. there is a Y ⊂ DRef such that:∀ 〈w, f 〉 ∈ s[Dom(f ) = Y ]
(notation: Y= Base(s), the base of s)
(66) possibilities (notation): if i ∈ s ∈ I , then i = 〈wi, fi〉
(67) empty information state:Λ = {〈w, ∅〉 w ∈ W }
(68) information state interpretation of proper DRS K:
a. Kis,f = {〈w, g〉 g ⊇U(K) f and g |=w K
}
b. Kis = Kis∅
(69) set of regular context change potentials J :
j ∈ J iff
a. j is a partial function fromI toI
b. there is aY ⊂ DRef such that: s ∈ Dom(j) iff Y ⊆ Base(s)
(notation:Y = Pres(j) , the referential presuppositions of j )
c. there is aZ ⊂ DRef such that: if s ∈ Dom(j) , thenBase(j (s)) = Base(s)∪
Z (notation:Z = Base(j), the base of j)
d. j (s) = ⋃i∈s j ({i})
(70) dynamic/CCP interpretation of DRS K:
Kccp ∈ J and Kccp(s) = {〈w, f 〉 ∃g[〈w, g〉 ∈ s and f ⊇U(K) g and f |=w K]},
ifFV (K) ⊆ Base(s); undefined otherwise.
(71) s contains a least as much information as s′ :
s  s′ iff for all 〈w, f 〉 ∈ s there is a g ⊆ f such that 〈w, g〉 ∈ s′.
(72) merge of information states:
s unionmulti s′ = {〈w, f ∪ f ′〉 〈w, f 〉 ∈ s and 〈w, f ′〉 ∈ s′ and f ∪ f ′ is a function}
Attitude Description Theory (ADT)
(73) K ′ referentially depends onK :
K ≺ K ′ iffFV (K ′) ∩ U(K) = ∅
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(74) dependencies of an attitude DRSK in an ADSK :
Deps(K,K ) = {K ′ ∃l[〈l, K ′〉 ∈ K ∧ K ′ ≺ K]}





Kis ifK is proper
Kccp(K1
is
K unionmulti . . . unionmulti KnisK ) ifK improper and
Deps(K,K ) = {K1 . . . Kn}
(76) referential dependence for CCPs:
j ≺∗ j ′ iffPres(j ′) ∩ Base(j) = ∅
(77) dependencies of an attitude CCP j in an ISBASA :
Deps(j,A ) = {j ′ ∈ A j ′ ≺∗ j}





j (Λ) if j is total
j (IS(j1,A ) unionmulti . . . unionmulti IS(jn,A )) if j is non-total and
Deps(j,A ) = {j1 . . . jn}
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